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Security of supply

Security of supply

Transmission, storage and treatment of natural gas are currently Gasunie’s core functions. As can be seen in our impact report, the economic value of the energy we transport is enormous. Accordingly, our stakeholders attach great importance to our core services and the support products and services we offer being available at all times, without interruption.

Transmission security

Transmission interruptions
In 2023 we provided a high level of transmission security for our customers in the Netherlands and Germany. There was one transmission interruption in the Netherlands (3 in 2022). This interruption, at an interconnection point with a German customer, fortunately did not cause any problems, this thanks to timely communication with the customer. There were no transmission interruptions in Germany (1 in 2022). We have set ourselves a standard of no more than six transmission interruptions in any one year; we stayed below this figure in 2023.

Uncontrolled events
Uncontrolled events are incidents involving gas leaks (of natural gas, green gas, hydrogen, nitrogen, air) of over 14,000m3 from a Gasunie-operated pressure holder with a rated pressure of 8 bar or higher. From 2022, we tightened the requirement for the maximum number of uncontrolled events, from 3 annually to no more than 2 per year. No uncontrolled events occurred in 2023 (1 in 2022).

Peak supply 
Peak supply is an important public task carried out by GTS for small users in the Netherlands. Peak supply must be distributed if the mean effective 24-hour temperature falls to below -9°C. GTS provides all the necessary facilities in the area of gas procurement and sales, flexibility services, and gas transmission over the national grid. There were no peak supply deliveries in 2023.

Transmission performance

Gasunie Transport Services 
In 2023, Gasunie Transport Services transmitted 701 TWh (65.2 bcm) of gas, a drop of roughly 11% compared to the 784 TWh (73.5 bcm) in 2022 and yet another historic low. The decrease is completely down to the lower volume of G-gas transmitted: H-gas transmission has remained virtually unchanged. Domestic consumption has fallen by 4.5%, and transport abroad by 6%. Transmission of gas to fill storage facilities fell by 36%. 

The decrease in transmission can be attributed to an increase in the gas price as a result of the shortage caused by the sharply reduced supply from Russia to Europe, the phasing out of the G-gas market abroad (Germany, Belgium and France) and, to a very large extent, the storage facilities being filled to a much higher level at the end of winter 2022/2023 than the year before.

Domestic production of gas and the volume of gas imported to the Netherlands fell by 26.5% and 22.5% respectively. Feed in of gas from Dutch gas stores and German gas storage facilities connected to the GTS network also decreased. These declining volumes were offset by a sharp increase in feed in of gas via LNG imports.

Our LNG subsidiaries Gate terminal and EemsEnergyTerminal together fed 20.2 bcm of natural gas into the GTS network in 2023, an increase of more than 31% compared to 2022. This brings the share of LNG in the entry mix nearly to that of foreign pipeline gas. In 2023, EemsEnergyTerminal (5.8 bcm) completed its first full year of operation and Gate Terminal (14.4 bcm) was running at full capacity. Over our BBL interconnector pipeline between the Netherlands and the UK, 1.7 bcm arrived in 2023, half the volume we saw in 2022. The unrest on the gas markets has subsided compared to a year earlier, and price differences and volatility between the two market areas have decreased.

Despite further reduction of production from the Groningen gas field, in 2023 GTS needed to convert less H-gas to G-gas as high temperatures and high gas prices pushed down demand for G-gas. The volume of converted H-gas decreased by 17%, from 324 TWh (28.7 bcm) in 2022 to 269 TWh (23.9 bcm) in 2023. The associated volume of nitrogen used decreased from 3.36 bcm to 2.84 bcm over the same period.


Source of gas in the GTS network, 2023 versus 2022


Destination of gas in the GTS network, 2023 versus 2022

Gasunie Deutschland
In 2023, Gasunie Deutschland transmitted 272 TWh (27.9 bcm) of gas over its grid, a decrease of 16% compared to the 324 TWh (33.2 bcm) transmitted in 2022. With the decline in gas flows from Russia and given its location in the north-western region of Germany, GUD’s network played a crucial role in the transport of replacement gas flows from Norway and the Netherlands. 


Entry volumes of gas in the GTS network*, 2023 versus 2022

* The total volume that GUD transports on an annual basis is greater than the sum of the entry volumes shown in these visuals. GUD’s gas transmission network is linked to those of other German TSOs. The entry volumes shown are GUD’s share in the volumes stated in the ‘nominations’ (i.e. shipper’s request) at the entry points.

Security of supply

Cold winter
Gasunie Transport Services has the statutory duty to inform and advise the Dutch government on the security of supply in the Netherlands. Following on from the GTS study ‘Een jaar zonder Russisch gas’ (a year without Russian gas) published in July 2022, in May 2023 GTS published an updated analysis (both reports are in Dutch). In this update, the consequences of the closure of the Groningen field as of 1 October 2023 as announced by the government were also taken into account.

The analysis shows that it is possible to further reduce production from the Groningen field in the 2023-2024 gas year (October to October). Still, it appears that in some situations it may be necessary to keep a number of production clusters in reserve so that they can be cranked up within a few hours to deal with acute shortages. 

This could be, for example, when a problem arises in a gas storage facility at the same time as a cold snap hits. Though the chance of this happening is small it cannot be ruled out. In June 2023, the Dutch government took the decision to close the Groningen gas field.

In late January 2024, GTS presented its advice regarding how to guarantee security of gas supply for the 2024/25 gas year. GTS’ analysis shows that, after the closure of the Groningen gas field, a shortage of capacity may still arise over the coming two gas years. For 2024, GTS estimates a shortage of roughly 10 GW during periods of high peak demand for gas. Additionally, GTS warns that it will prove difficult over the coming years – after cold winters – to get gas stocks in storage facilities back up to adequate levels over the summer periods. The volume shortage could be solved by generating additional supply through, for example, a higher pipeline utilisation rate, which can be achieved by expanding or maintaining existing LNG terminals, or by building new LNG terminals.

Gas stores
To ensure that the Netherlands would be as well prepared as possible for the winter and to become less dependent on Russian gas, the storage facilities were filled higher than usual last year. The Dutch storage facilities were filled to almost full capacity at the end of October 2023; the occupancy rate was at 82% at the end of 2023, while this was 77% at the end of 2022.

Quality conversion
With the commissioning of the nitrogen plant in Zuidbroek in October 2023, a maximum of 10 bcm of pseudo Groningen gas (‘pseudo G-gas’) can be produced annually by blending nitrogen into imported high-calorific gas. From winter 2024-2025, the new plant will work to guarantee security of supply during cold spells once the Groningen gas field is permanently closed. In the summer, the plant will eventually be used to fill the seasonal gas storage facilities with pseudo G-gas.

The construction of the nitrogen plant has faced significant delays due to the COVID-19 crisis and delays in the supply of building materials and building components, along with the main contractor and subcontractor not being able to see eye to eye. Though we certainly regret this, fortunately, thanks to the fall in demand for gas due to high market prices and the gas storage facilities proving to be sufficiently filled, this did not result in problems regarding security of supply during the winters of 2022-2023 and 2023-2024.

Dependence on other countries
The planned closure of the Groningen gas field and declining domestic production is leading to growing dependence on gas imports from other countries. The complete shutdown of Russian gas supply increases dependence on H-gas in the global LNG market. The visual below shows the extent to which the Netherlands is able to meet domestic consumption (gas leaving the GTS network) with domestic production (gas feed-in to the GTS network). This is the total of everything less storage facilities/caverns and LNG. This was negative for the first time in 2018, meaning the Netherlands was unable to supply its domestic market with domestic production. The flows of H-gas entering and exiting the GTS network more or less balance. There is a major shortage of G-gas, however, which is compensated for by converting H-gas from abroad to attain gas with the same calorific value as G-gas.


The Netherlands is unable to meet domestic market demand through its domestic production
(in bcm/year)

The chart above in tabular form:

Year Totaal H-gas G-gas
2005 32.16744546583 24.435459862439 7.7319856033918
2006 31.930049244584 24.848282262992 7.0817669815921
2007 30.024515962406 25.436506954738 4.5880090076674
2008 38.955831739861 24.616255191174 14.339576548687
2009 32.877135375985 21.445189216244 11.431946159741
2010 38.941922019724 18.471252290509 20.470669729215
2011 37.147262502816 15.793817639857 21.353444862959
2012 38.391028942407 17.002090839241 21.388825158263
2013 42.611708780218 16.534356249923 26.077352407247
2014 33.720654155572 13.326172916136 20.393986217583
2015 14.034684610187 13.236958100922 0.79763704061262
2016 10.189115733406 10.792616447169 -0.60346238333954
2017 4.4859147238926 7.9882592495101 -3.5023498887475
2018 -3.0258007753775 4.3717605867632 -7.397579824435
2019 -8.9797017003632 0.080917858323101 -9.0606613271445
2020 -11.099608737988 -0.30751991840539 -10.792095140757
2021 -12.982323256178 0.56575946714459 -13.547908100069
2022 -9.1646864812115 0.98515090905711 -10.149872178301
2023 -12.927200207836 -1.3130844064952 -11.614126303528

Expansions 
LNG in Germany
Germany plans to build permanent LNG terminals at the ports of Brunsbüttel, Wilhelmshaven and Stade. These terminals, scheduled to be ready in 2026 and 2027, will help end dependence on Russian fossil fuels, as envisioned in the REPowerEU plan. Gasunie is to lead the project and will be the future operator of German LNG, the terminal in Brunsbüttel that is expected to be able to regasify approximately 10 bcm of LNG annually from the end of 2026 and supply the gas to the German grid. The project costs of € 1.3 billion will be borne by the three shareholders: Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) on behalf of the German government (50%), RWE (10%), and Gasunie (40%).

Because of the importance of German LNG for German security of supply, in July 2023 the European Commission approved € 40 million in state aid for the construction and operation of the terminal. ConocoPhillips, INEOS and RWE Supply & Trading have all signed for capacity at the terminal. The planning and permitting process for German LNG is currently underway. The terminal is being designed in such a way as to facilitate the import of green hydrogen or hydrogen carriers such as ammonia. The new permanent, onshore terminal will soon replace the FSRU Deutsche Energy Terminal (DET) currently operates in Brunsbüttel.

To bridge the period between the construction and commissioning of the planned German onshore terminals, a total of five FSRUs are being chartered by market parties to berth in Brunsbüttel, Wilhelmshaven, Stade and Lubmin. GUD has been tasked with connecting the FSRUs in Brunsbüttel and Stade and the onshore terminals at the same locations to its high-pressure grid. We are doing this by rapidly constructing four new pipelines. After successful completion of the first pipeline, we faced unprecedented rainfall during the construction of the next two pipelines in 2023, which created extremely poor soil conditions. Damage to one of the pipelines, deliberately caused by third parties, was discovered during inspection. This damage has been repaired and, after a careful final inspection, the pipeline was put into operation with minimal delay at the beginning of 2024. The fourth and final pipeline will be operational at the end of 2026 or early 2027.

To handle the large volumes of gas entering the network from the LNG terminals, GUD is building a new fully electric compressor station downstream in its network (in Achim-West), which will be ready for commissioning in 2026 or 2027. The current Achim/Embsen compressor station has gained enormously in importance since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the loss of gas volumes from the east. The two compressor units installed at this station had been operating non-stop to meet the current capacity demand, meaning that no backup was available and that a failure of either of these would have a significant impact on security of supply. To address this situation, in 2023 we built a new compressor station in Embsen in record time and moved a compressor unit from the Quarnstedt compressor station and installed it at this new station. The work was completed in October 2023.

LNG in Netherlands
We are working on initiatives to expand the existing capacity of the onshore (permanent) LNG terminal at Maasvlakte (Gate terminal) and the temporary LNG terminal at Eemshaven (EemsEnergyTerminal). At Gate this concerns a fourth tank with a regasification capacity of 4 bcm. The tank is expected to become operational in the second half of 2026 and the newly created capacity has already been sold under long-term agreements. The investment will come out to around € 350 million. At the port of Eemshaven, we are investigating a technical optimisation to increase the capacity of the FSRU from 8 bcm to 10 bcm. The investments at both locations can contribute towards the transition to green hydrogen.

Conversions at major industrial users 
By law, major industrial gas consumers who used more than 100 million cubic metres (0.98 TWh) of gas per year in the 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 gas years were required to stop using low-calorific gas as of 1 October 2022. This concerns nine companies with a collective annual demand of about 3 bcm (29.3 TWh), five of which have now been switched or disconnected. The remaining conversion projects are encountering delays due to lengthy permitting processes and the nation-wide nitrogen oxide problem in the Netherlands. However, the recent ‘Porthos ruling’ offers prospects for a quick restart. The companies that still need to be switched over have been granted a temporary exemption that allows them to keep using low-calorific gas until their conversion date.

Conversion programmes for neighbouring countries 
Countries neighbouring the Netherlands also depend in part on low-calorific gas. Unlike the Netherlands, which opted to build a nitrogen plant to produce low-calorific gas to replace the Groningen gas, the authorities in Germany, France, and Belgium are requiring all end users to switch to high-calorific gas. For this they will need to have their appliances like boilers, stoves and ovens overhauled. The conversion programmes for homes in Germany, France and Belgium to reduce their demand for Dutch low-calorific gas are proceeding according to plan. Partly due to this, exports are falling by an average of 2 to 3 bcm (20-30 TWh) per year and will be virtually zero by the end of this decade.

IT security

Energy transmission and storage is so vital to society that outages or interruptions can lead to serious social disruption and even pose a threat to national security. Gasunie’s networks are therefore classified as ‘vital infrastructure’. Gasunie works together with government bodies and other infrastructure operators to protect this vital infrastructure.

One of the conditions for guaranteeing security of supply is that our digital systems and digital data must be adequately secured. The geopolitical developments as a result of the Ukraine war have, for the second year now, led to an increased focus on, and strengthening of our current security measures in all IT domains and an increased focus on business continuity and resilience. There is a general awareness in the company that these aspects need ongoing attention.

Our focus on information security is not solely an inward one. Given the vital importance of an uninterrupted supply of energy for the Netherlands, Germany and the rest of Europe, we work together with other parties in the energy value chain and with various government bodies to prevent possible future disruptions to the supply, transport and transmission of energy.

Our IT security and business continuity measures in 2023 were aligned with internal and external digital threats. There were no IT disruptions with an impact on the essential business processes. Potential crisis situations and business disruptions, as a result of vulnerabilities in suppliers’ software for example, have been adequately resolved.

What Gasunie is doing about cybersecurity 

  • Cybersecurity, business continuity and crisis management are all part of our governance structure. 
  • We continuously monitor systems, networks, applications and services for incidents, events and threats, relating to data breaches and cyberattacks, for example. 
  • We conduct regular internal and external security audits and penetration tests of our systems, products and practices that affect user data and access to the systems. 
  • Annual audits are conducted as part of our ISO 27001 certification; these have been conducted for the Netherlands over the last nine years, and over the last seven years for Germany, with positive outcomes. 
  • Various government bodies also conduct cybersecurity audits based on European and national laws and regulations, and we also carry out our own audits and assessments as required by government bodies in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK. 
  • We participate in various cybersecurity and crisis management exercises organised by the energy transmission sector and the government, both periodic and one-off. 
  • We run corporate security awareness programmes in the Netherlands and Germany that encompass all aspects of information security. These are aimed at raising awareness of information security risks among our staff and improving their behaviour by paying ongoing attention to this topic.

Quickly resolving a serious incident together


Damaged pipeline repaired by multiple parties without interrupting supply
The Dutch subsurface is a busy place. Gasunie manages thousands of kilometres of pipeline and shares the available space with many other parties. We have extensive procedures and precautions in place to ensure that our pipes are not damaged, and yet, things still sometimes go wrong. Like, for example, when, on a Wednesday in June 2023, one of our supervisors noticed that four new floodlight columns had suddenly appeared at a football pitch in Spaarndam and realised that one of these had been installed more or less above one of our pipelines. So, of course we took immediate action.


Pipeline damage

The contractor failed to submit the required KLIC (planned excavation work) report and so started the works without Gasunie first assessing whether this was safe. Given that this was a gas pipeline with a diameter of around one meter, this oversight could have had serious consequences. We reduced the pressure in the pipeline by 10% and had Korf KB, a specialist in pipeline coating and cathodic protection, check whether the low-voltage current on our pipeline could also be detected on the column. If it could this would mean that it was in contact with the pipeline. They concluded that this was the case. 


Uninterrupted supply

Now all parties put their heads together. The following steps were determined during a meeting between our Central Command Post and our Operations Assets and Safety Inspection departments. Given that the reduced pressure could cause supply problems in the long term we had to resolve this situation quickly. Emergency incident response contractor Visser & Smit Hanab arrived on the scene with an excavator, vacuum truck and incident response container full of equipment and materials. An operational crisis team made up of specialists decided that the pipeline would need to be emptied using jet vacuumation. However, to use this method the pressure in the pipeline first had to be reduced further, which could only be done with the help of an emergency pressure reduction unit and emergency pipeline. It was all hands on deck, with everyone working non-stop from early in the morning until late at night to clear the pipeline and repair the damaged coating. The incident was fully resolved by Saturday evening.


Working hard together
Of course, there is a whole process in place for exactly these types of incidents. Still, each situation is different. Together with all parties involved, we determine what needs to be done and when. We are in constant contact with each other, and everyone has the same information at the same time. It is precisely this quick response and working hard together that ensures that we can resolve these types of incidents safely and without jeopardising security of supply.

Our emergency incident response service, with skilled people and incident response containers, can respond 24/7 to these types of incidents. It’s fantastic work, especially because you never know in advance exactly what you will find. Together we get great things done and resolve incidents quickly and safely.